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Abstract 
 
CSR become one of the highlighted activities, aligned with the requirement to adopt the interest 
of stakeholders. This study aims to search whether the earnestness of companies to manage 
CSR as disclosed in their sustainability reporting reduces information asymmetry. The sample 
consists of the companies that have published sustainability reporting for the period 2008-2014 
and listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. The finding of this research are as follow: (1) unlike the 
previous research that found a reducing of information asymmetry after the issuing of 
sustainability reporting, this study finds the opposite, that the higher the disclosure of CSR 
activities, the wider the spread, (2) further, this study finds that the companies which have a 
negative earning tend to disclose more CSR  information (3) The presence of institutional 
investors representing well-informed investors help the company to ensure the reliability of CSR 
activity information delivered through Sustainability Reporting. 
 
Keywords: Bid-Ask Spread, Information Asymmetry, Sustainability Reporting 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Companies with a high CSR rating provide broader disclosure as a form of their responsibility to 
stakeholders (Gelb and Strawser, 2001). Cho et al. (2013) stated that CSR activities motivate 
companies to provide public disclosure. CSR disclosure is used as a tool by companies in 
communicating about the attitudes, policies or actions of the company to stakeholders including 
the community as a whole on the impact of the company's operational activities on society and 
the environment (Setyorini and Ishak, 2012; Mathews, 1995; Campbell and Shiller, 1988). 
Disclosures regarding CSR aspects are not found in the company's financial statements (Jensen 
and Berg, 2011). Thus, CSR disclosures complement financial (economic) disclosures and help 
demonstrate the company's efforts and commitment in increasing transparency to investors 
regarding the company's performance and risk management (Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Martinez et al. 
2015). The higher information disclosed by the company will show the increasing information 
transparency (Fung, 2014) and will reduce information asymmetry (Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1991; Reverte, 2011; Cui et al. 2012, 2018; Cho et al. 2013; Lopatta et al. 2015). 
Although there is some evidence that CSR disclosure can reduce information asymmetry, 
research on the effect of CSR on information asymmetry has not been done much. Some studies 
have found a significant negative relationship between CSR and information asymmetry among 
them (Cui et al. 2012; Cho et al. 2013; Lopatta et al. 2015; Lu and Chueh, 2015; Semenescu and 
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Curmei, 2015; Cui et al. 2018; Diebecker and Sommer, 2017). Many prior studies have 
investigated the direct relationship between CSR and financial performance (Alexander and 
Buchholz, 1978; Aupperle et al. 1985; Guidry and Patten 2010; Hermawan and Mulyawan 2014; 
Firli and Akbar, 2016). 
In Indonesia, CSR and information asymmetry research has also not been systematically 
summarized, because there have not been many studies exploring CSR disclosure to information 
asymmetry. Existing researches have focused on the motivation of implementing CSR, the 
relationship of CSR with performance, and how consumers respond to disclosure of CSR 
activities (Hidayati and Murni, 2009; Dewi et al. 2014; Hermawan and Mulyawan, 2014). This 
study fills the gap in previous empirical studies, so that more empirical evidence can be obtained 
regarding CSR, which is theoretically predicted to contribute to the reduction of information 
asymmetry (Cui et al. 2012; Cho et al. 2013; Lopatta et al. 2015; Lu and Chueh, 2015; Semenescu 
and Curmei, 2015; Cui et al. 2018; Diebecker and Sommer, 2017). Second, this study contributes 
to broadening previous empirical evidence about a decline in information asymmetry on CSR 
activities delivered in the Sustainability Reporting. 
 
2. Literature Review  
2.1. Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
Stakeholder theory states that the survival and success of a company depend on fulfilling 
economic and non-economic (social and environmental) goals through meeting the interests of 
stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995; Pirsch et al. 2007; Laplume et al. 2008). Stakeholders theory is 
based on the idea that outside investors, several people or groups have rights or interests related 
to company actions and decisions (Clarkson, 1995; Branco and Rodrigues, 2007). When 
companies make strategic decisions, companies must care about the interests of all stakeholders. 
CSR is an implementation of Stakeholder theory, representing groups or people that must 
be considered in the company's business activities (Carroll, 1991; Branco and Rodrigues, 2007; 
Omran and Ramdhony, 2015). The company is expected to be responsible not only to investors 
but to all parties by helping resolve social and environmental problems caused by the company 
(Elijido-Ten, 2007). CSR implies that companies strive to achieve economic performance by 
considering the social and environmental impacts of their actions on each entity that may be 
directly or indirectly influenced by the company going forward (Cormier et al. 2011; Lu and Chueh, 
2015). Van Marrewijk (2003) and Joseph (2009) define CSR as an activity that reflects the 
company's moral responsibility as a whole for the impact of the company's operational activities 
on society and environment. In social terms related to employees, human rights, society, and 
product responsibility (Taskin, 2015). Concerning the environment, it shows how a company pays 
attention to environmental impacts and through company actions or initiatives to minimize 
ecological impacts, such as waste management, recycling etc. (Saleh, 2009).  
CSR relates to phenomena such as transparency and sustainability report (Van 
Marrewijk, 2003). Companies with high CSR performance are expected to be able to disclose 
broader non-financial information, thereby increase the transparency of information for investors 
(Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Martinez et al. 2015). In Indonesia, according to BAPEPAM-LK Regulation 
XK6 concerning Submission of Annual Report of Issuers or Public Companies in 2012, companies 
have to disclose information on CSR performance in annual reports or separate reports, such as 
sustainability reports or reports on corporate social responsibility delivered together with an 
annual report to BAPEPAM. 
 
2.2. Information Asymmetry 
 
Information asymmetry describes a situation where one party has more information (Nestorowicz, 
2014; Martinez et al. 2015) and does not pass it on to others (Boujelbene and Besbes, 2012). 
Internal parties, such as management and board of director members (BoD) have more 
advantages than external stakeholders regard 
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ing information about company’s activities, revenue, events or company decisions that may affect 
stock prices and performance company in the future (Lopatta et al. 2015; Liu et al. 2013). 
Investors need clear information to provide an assessment of the real company (Scordis et al. 
2008). 
When the level of disclosure is inadequate, those who feel they have inadequate 
information such as investors will protect themselves by giving prices that are lower than the 
actual price or refusing to do transactions that ultimately lead to an increase in bid-ask spreads 
(Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Thorne et al. 2014). This is in line with what Akerlof (1970) put forward that 
the information asymmetry phenomenon causes a good car to be valued as much as a lemon car 
because of the widening gap with the real information.  
This study uses the bid-ask spread to measure information asymmetry, referring to 
Cormier et al. (2011), Cho et al. (2013), Hung et al. (2013), Lu and Chueh (2015), Cui et al. (2018), 
Diebecker and Sommer (2017). Bid-ask spread shows the difference between the prices offered 
at the requested price. The wider the spread shows, the higher information asymmetry (Diebecker 
and Sommer, 2017).  
 
2.3. Hypothesis Development 
 
CSR activities as the manifestation of the Stakeholder Theory (Carroll, 1991; Branco and 
Rodrigues, 2007), where the company seeks to accommodate the interests of all stakeholders 
(Elijido-Ten, 2007). This encourages companies to provide disclosures on CSR activities (Joseph, 
2009; Cormier et al. 2011; Cho et al. 2013; Diebecker and Sommer, 2017). The company's action 
to provide CSR disclosure is a signal delivered to outside parties that the company is a good 
company (Mahoney, 2012; Thorne et al. 2014). The company does not only strive to achieve 
economic performance but is also morally responsible for all parties (Cormier et al. 2011; Lu and 
Chueh, 2015). CSR disclosure increases the availability of information for investors (Su et al. 
2014; Martinez et al. 2015).   
Higher CSR disclosures will provide additional non-financial information to increase 
information transparency (Liu et al. 2013; Cui et al. 2018). This will lead to a decrease in 
information asymmetry (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Reverte, 2011; Cui et al. 2012, 2018; 
Cho et al. 2013; Lopatta et al. 2015). With the increasing amount of information, investors are 
expected to be able to provide an assessment as expected by the company (Kirmani and Rao, 
2000; Scordis et al. 2008; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Mahoney 2012; Su et al. 2014). Investors who 
have more information about the condition of the company will set a bargaining price that is close 
to the requested price or in the ask that is approaching the bid. This will then cause the difference 
between the bid and ask to narrow the bid-ask spread (Akerlof, 1970; Greenstein and Sami, 1994; 
Cormier et al. 2011). 
Previous research consistently stated that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) affects 
information asymmetry. Cormier et al. (2011) with a sample of large Canadian companies in 2005, 
found that social and environmental disclosure reduced information asymmetry, as reflected in 
the volatility of stock prices and lower bid-ask spreads. Lopatta et al. (2015), Cui et al. (2012, 
2018) and Cho et al. (2013) researched US companies to find consistent results that there is an 
inverse relationship between CSR involvement and the level of information asymmetry.   
Similar results were expressed in Hung et al. (2013), and Liu et al. (2013) who researched 
companies in China found that CSR can play the same role as financial disclosure in promoting 
stock market transparency and then affecting investor behavior. With CSR reporting can cause a 
decrease in information asymmetry. In Indonesia, Hapsoro and Zidni (2015) conducted a study 
of 167 high-profile companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) found that overall 
disclosures related to CSR performance had a negative and significant relationship to the bid-ask 
spread. Based on the explanation above and previous research studies, the hypothesis proposed 
in this study are: 
 
H1: The level of CSR disclosure hurts information asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask 
spread. 
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3. Research Methodology 
 
This study examines the information presented by the company through CSR disclosures that are 
reported separately in sustainability reporting. This study includes some control variables such as 
leverage, negative earnings, liquidity ratios and the proportion of institutional ownership that is a 
proxy of investors who are well-informed, to test the hypothesis 
 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐼𝐾𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 +
                       𝛽5𝐾𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝜀                                                                                                 (1) 
 
where:  
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖,𝑡    = the average of the bid and ask spread during the stock trading period for the firm i 
in period i,t 
𝑇𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1     = the level of CSR disclosure form the firm i in period t-1 
𝐿𝐸𝑉i,𝑡−1        = company lever for the firm  i in period  t-1 
𝐿𝐴𝐵𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1= negative earning of firm i in period  t-1 
𝐿𝐼𝐾𝑈𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1  = liquidity ratio for the firm i   in period t-1 
𝐾𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1    = institutional ownership of the firm  i in period t-1 
 
3.1. Variable Operationalization  
3.1.1. Bid-Ask Spread (SPREAD) 
 
Bid-Ask Spread is a proxy of information asymmetry. This measurement refers to Cormier et al. 
2011), Cho et al. (2013), Hung et al. (2013), Hapsoro and Zidni (2015), Lu and Chueh (2015), Cui 
et al. (2018), Diebecker and Sommer (2017). SPREAd is obtained from the spread at the end of 
the day divided by the average price of the last bid and ask. Daily spreads are then summed up 
and divided by the number of trading days for the annual spread. The formula for calculating 
SPREAD is as follow: 
𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐴𝐷𝑖 =
∑
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝐵𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡+ 𝐴𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡
2
𝑛
𝑖
𝑛
           (2) 
 
where: 
SPREADi = Average bid and ask difference during the stock trading period i 
Si, t   = Difference between last bid and ask on day t of stock i 
BID i, t   = Last price offered on day t of stock i 
ASK i, t   = The last price requested on day t of stock i 
n   = Number of trading days in a year 
 
3.1.2. Corporate Social Responsibility (TCSR) 
 
The level of disclosure of Corporate Social Responsibility (TCSR) shows how much disclosure of 
CSR activities carried out by the company through sustainability report (SR). The assessment 
uses the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) reference, both version 3.0, 3.1, or 4.0 which are core 
options, following the references used by each company. If the company discloses the criteria in 
the GRI, then it will be given a score of 1, if not disclosed then given a score of 0. The score is 
then summed and divided by the total GRI criteria. The total criteria for GRI version 3.0 are 79 
criteria, GRI version 3.1 is 84 criteria, while GRI version 4.0 with core options is 91 criteria. The 
GRI measurement index is also used by many previous studies such as Guidry and Patten (2010), 
Najah and Jarboui (2013), Hapsoro and Zidni (2015), and Taskin (2015). 
 
TCSR = 
Σcompany disclosure
Σ𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 GRI 
                                                             (3) 
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3.1.3. Leverage (LEV) 
 
Leverage is measured by dividing total debt with total assets, such as Ryan (1996), Cormier et 
al. (2011), Dhaliwal et al. (2011), Lopatta et al. (2015), and Habbash (2016). Debt is an obligation 
due to the influx of funds into the company, such as loans. 
 
3.1.4. Negative earning (LABNEG) 
 
Negative earning is part of the company's risk. Negative profit indicates a loss in the company's 
operations (Hayn, 1995) is determined when the company's profit after tax shows a negative 
value. This study uses a dummy variable if the company loses the value of 1, and if it does not 
experience a loss, it is given a value of 0.  
 
3.1.5. Institutional Investors (KINST) 
 
The number of institutional investors is a proxy of investors who have greater information access 
to the company, measured by the proportion of share ownership by institutional investors. 
Institutional investors are considered to have more information than individual investors.  
 
3.1.6. Liquidity (LIKUID) 
 
The level of liquidity shows the level of short-term risk of a company, as measured by the portion 
of current liabilities divided by total current assets. 
 
3.2. Samples 
 
This study assesses CSR disclosures reported by companies through separate reports, known 
as sustainability reporting. The reason for not using CSR disclosures through annual reports is 
because companies that individually convey information on CSR activities separately show a high 
commitment to social and environmental responsibility.  
The sample selection in this study follows a purposive sampling technique, where the 
sample is selected based on the following criteria: (1) the company publishes sustainability 
reporting, (2) is registered in the GRI database in 2008 - 2014, (3) has been listed on the 
Exchange Indonesian Securities, and (3) have the data needed to calculate SPREAD. There were 
131 observations from 34 companies that met the criteria as research samples. 
 
4. Results 
 
The number of sustainability reporting (SR) published from 2008 to 2014, as many as 250 reports, 
but as many as 80 reports were published by companies that are not yet listed on the IDX. 
Besides, four reports do not have a bid and ask data, so they are excluded from the sample. 
There were 131 SR reports published by 34 companies, which met the requirements as samples. 
The sample profile is as follows. 
On average, companies convey CSR disclosures that are quite high, namely as much as 
58.7% of the standard criteria set by the GRI version. Even some companies express fully under 
GRI, because of the maximum value of 1. SPREAD which represents the existence of information 
asymmetry from the sample company has a relatively narrow average. 
The results of the hypothesis are presented in Table 1, showing that high CSR 
performance represented by the score of CSR implementation (TCSR) has a positive and 
significant effect on SPREAD. The higher the TCSR is directly proportional to the increase in 
SPREAD. Investors have not seen that the score of CSR disclosure is high as an effort to 
distribute information as widely as possible to the public.  
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Table 1. Testing hypotheses using 131 observations 
Dependent variable: SPREAD 
 Coefficient t-ratio p-value 
TCSR 0.00332 4.175 <0.0001 
LEV 0.00364 4.060 <0.0001 
LABNEG 0.00827 4.706 <0.0001 
LIKUID −0.00110 −0.903 0.3682 
KINST −0.00054 −2.890 0.0045 
R-squared  0.28185 Adjt.R-squared  0.25313 
F(5, 125)  9.81210 P-value(F)  6.27e-08 
 
Following the results of Cho et al. (2013) which proves that there is an institutional role of 
investors in enlarging SPREAD, this study tries to integrate CSR variables and institutional 
investors (Table 2). The test results show that the existence of institutional investors narrows 
SPREAD, contrary to previous research. This can be seen from the negative and significant 
KINST*TCSR interaction coefficient. Institutional investors have high confidence in their private 
information about the company's CSR activities, thus reducing doubts about the information 
disclosed in sustainability reporting. Without being interacted with the CSR disclosure score, it 
turns out that the KINST variable widens the SPREAD (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Testing of Interaction of Institutional Investors and CSR Score 
Dependent variable: SPREAD 
 Coefficient t-ratio p-value 
const 0.00238 2.536 0.0125 
TCSR 0.00520 4.532 <0.0001 
LEV 0.00739 4.235 <0.0001 
LABNEG −0.00181 −1.345 0.1811 
LIKUID −0.00057 −3.330 0.0011 
KINST 0.00578 2.530 0.0127 
KINST*TCSR −0.00542 −1.845 0.0674 
R-squared  0.29072 Adjt.R-squared  0.25640 
F(5, 125)  8.47085 P-value(F)  1.04e-07 
 
5. Discussion 
 
The results showed the opposite of predicted that the level of disclosure of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) had a significant positive effect on information asymmetry as measured by 
the bid-ask spread. This result is not consistent with previous studies such as Cui et al. (2012), 
Cormier et al. (2011), Cho et al. (2013), Hung et al. (2013), Liu et al. (2013), Lopatta et al. (2015), 
Lu and Chueh (2015), Martinez et al. (2015), Semenescu and Curmei (2015), Cui et al. (2018), 
Diebecker and Sommer (2017), which states that CSR has a negative influence on information 
asymmetry. 
This study found that the higher the level of disclosure of corporate social responsibility 
(TCSR), the higher the information asymmetry, which was reflected in the higher value of the bid-
ask spread (SPREAD). Jaggi and Freedman (1992) show that companies that provide disclosure 
of CSR activities do not receive positive responses from investors. Investors consider the extent 
of the disclosure provided by the company does not contain additional information for them (Jaggi 
and Freedman, 1982). Investors suspect the company's actions that provide broad disclosure as 
a company effort to be seen as a good company. 
The follow-up tests conducted above revealed that companies that have negative profits 
make more CSR disclosures to distract investors from deteriorating operational performance. This 
answers why investors generally do not believe in the substantial amount of CSR disclosures. 
Investors have not captured the seriousness of the company to distribute information that occurs 
on the company's internal.  
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However, in contrast to previous studies which found that the existence of institutional 
investors was counterproductive with a decrease in asymmetry information (Cho et al. 2013), this 
study proved otherwise. When institutional investors have private information access to CSR 
activities carried out by the company, they do not use their superiority for their own benefit. Access 
to private information on CSR can eliminate investors' institutional doubts that the information 
submitted is less reliable. Institutional investor confidence will reduce the information gap which 
can be seen from the narrower bid-ask spread. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This study aims to examine the effect of the level of corporate social responsibility disclosure on 
information asymmetry as measured by the bid-ask spread. Contrary to the results of previous 
studies, this study found the opposite result, that CSR disclosure through Sustainability Reporting 
hurts decreasing information asymmetry. The higher counterproductive disclosure scores with a 
decrease in information asymmetry. 
An interesting phenomenon in developing countries, where the level of openness to 
disclose information is still suspected as an action with specific intentions to divert investor 
attention to the actual condition of the company. However, the investor's suspicion is entirely 
rational, given the additional testing results indicate a significant negative correlation between 
companies that have negative earnings and the extent of CSR disclosures. 
However, the existence of institutional investors representing investors who are well-
informed is enough to help the company to ensure the reliability of information on CSR activities 
delivered through Sustainability Reporting. In contrast to the results of previous studies which 
showed that institutional investors tend to use the superiority of information, they have to 
maximize their interests, in this study institutional investors also distributed the information they 
possess to reduce asymmetry information. 
This study has limitations because some companies do not continuously submit reports 
through SR, so consistency in the impact of CSR disclosures on the reduction of information 
asymmetry cannot be obtained. The number of companies submitting reports on CSR activities 
through SR is still very little less than 10% of the total companies listed on the IDX, thus limiting 
the generality of the results of this study. 
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